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5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter a set of generational accounts is constructed for Argentina. 
Subsequently, the resulting generational accounting framework is used to iden- 
tify policies to achieve intertemporal government budget balance, the fiscal 
role played by the country’s recent privatization program, and the fiscal impact 
of Argentina’s recent social security reform.’ 
Argentina’s generational accounts indicate a huge intertemporal imbalance 
that is robust to reasonable variation in assumptions and implies that the na- 
tion’s current fiscal policy put forward under the convertibility plan is unsus- 
tainable. Correcting this imbalance will require substantial cuts in government 
consumption and pension payments-cuts  that are far beyond anything cur- 
rently being debated. 
The analysis of the generational accounting effects of the social security re- 
form concludes that, most likely, the crisis in Argentina’s long-term fiscal fi- 
nances will not be solved solely by this reform. This is due to the fact that the 
social security reform constituted, to a large extent, simply a reclassification 
of  government liabilities in which implicit government IOUs were made ex- 
plicit; that is, the reform did not fundamentally reduce the government’s long- 
term expenditure commitments. 
Further, this chapter’s generational accounting shows that the manner in 
which Argentine privatization receipts were spent dissipated a large amount of 
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government net wealth and has significantly contributed to the country’s long- 
term generational imbalance. 
5.2  Argentine Economic Policy 
The current administration of President Menem took office on 9 July 1989, 
after the disastrous finale of the previous government of President Alfonsin. Al- 
fonsin’s electoral results, as well as his resignation, were intimately associated 
with the economic situation. 
Argentina’s economy suffered in 1989 its first hyperinflation caused by the 
lack of sustainable fiscal and monetary policies. In fact, we can say that Alfon- 
sin’s administration consistently failed to control public finances and trusted, 
instead,  in heterodox  policies.  These policies  produced,  with  low political 
costs,  short-lived periods  of  low inflation. However, once economic agents 
learned from past errors these periods became shorter and finally hypennfla- 
tion and chaos hit the economy. 
The first attempts of the present government to manage the fiscal situation 
were also unsuccessful (see table 5.1). As a result, the economy again got out 
of hand and the country was bashed by a second hyperinflation in  1990 (see 
table 5.2). 
Finally, during 199  1 the current-convertibility-stabilization  plan, put for- 
ward by Doming0 Cavallo as economy minister, was able to stabilize inflation. 
We turn now to a more detailed description of this plan and of its key fiscal 
policy tools. 
5.2.1  The Convertibility Plan 
The economic plan implemented in March 1991 was based on a law that es- 
tablished the convertibility of the austral at a rate of 10,000 australes per U.S. 
dollar and required full international reserve backing of the monetary base.2 It 
is important to remark that the implication of this “full backing” requirement 
is that, once satisfied, the public sector must produce the necessary funds to 
meet total services and repayment of the internal debt, as well as of the exter- 
nal debt.3 
The fiscal situation did not improve as fast as needed, but Cavallo was able 
to comply, on an “accounting basis,” with the law by increasing the central 
2. The central bank’s  holdings of U.S. dollar-denominated  government bonds (BONEX) were 
included in the definition of reserves. This loose end, eventually, provided a way to create money 
to finance the public sector deficit. In September 1991, backing of the monetary base through these 
securities was limited to 10 percent of it. 
3. These funds may come from overall operational balance (surplus), increases in the internal 
debt stock (which will  affect its future servicing and repayment), and the sale of public sector 
assets. The external debt is net of external flows not associated with money creation like interna- 
tional reserve interest payments and loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Bank, or other multilateral organizations. Note also that the latter inflows affect future servicing 
and repayment of the external debt. Table 5.1  Consolidated Nonfinancial Public Sector Accounts 1990-94 
(percent of GDP) 
~~ 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994' 
Revenues 
















16.5  18.8  21.0  21.6  21.3 
13.8  15.8  17.2  17.4  17.3 
2.7  3  .O  3.8  4.2  4.0 
20.6  22.0  21.4  21.5  22.5 
16.5  18.3  17.4  16.4  17.8 
4.1  3.7  4.0  5.1  4.7 
6.6  7.4  7.8  8.1  8.1 
4.0  5.0  5.6  5.1  5.4 
3.3  2.6  1.5  1.1  1.2 
3.9  4.7  4.6  4.9  4.9 
2.8  2.3  1.9  2.3  2.9 
-4.1  -3.2  -0.4  0.1  -1.2 
-2.1  -2.5  -0.2  0.9  -0.5 
-1.4  -0.7  -0.2  -0.8  -0.8 
0.4  1.2  0.8  1.5  0.3 
Source; International Monetary Fund. 
Notes: Prior to  1994, only the balance of various social security operations is included on the 
revenue side of the national nonfinancial public sector. Since 1994, revenue and expenditures of 
these operations are included separately. Similarly, prior to 1994, the National Employment Fund 
is excluded from the accounts, but it is included since 1994. From 1994 onward, contributions to 
private pension funds are excluded. 
"994  data for provincial governments are preliminary estimates. 
bIncludes enterprises' operating results; excludes privatization receipts. 
'Own-revenue only, excludes revenue transfers received from federal government. 
dIncludes federal government transfers to provinces. 
'Does  not include capitalized interest on BOCONs (debt consolidation bonds). 
Table 5.2  Inflation: Consumer Prices, 1989-94 (percent) 








































7.70  3.04 
26.99  2.15 
11.04  2.10 
5.51  1.29 
2.80  0.67 
3.12  0.78 
2.59  1.73 
1.30  1  SO 
1.77  1.03 
1.35  1.27 
0.39  0.46 
0.65  0.28  - 
84.0  17.5 
~ 
0.83  0.10 
0.73  -0.00 
0.75  0.14 
1.05  0.24 
1.29  0.35 
0.72  0.39 
0.32  0.92 
0.02  0.21 
0.82  0.68 
0.57  0.32 
0.06  0.23 
-0.01  0.22 
7.4  3.9 
Source: Techint (various issues). 106  Marcelo F. Altamiranda 
bank's  BONEX4 holdings. However, compared with past experience, the im- 
balance size was not out of contr01.~  Furthermore, soon after the convertibility 
launching the government made clear its strategy of expanding and accelerat- 
ing the privatization program to finance its deficit.6 
The political scenario began to exert a strong influence on economic policy 
during  1992 because the government started to work toward presidential re- 
election. The reason was that the reelection implied as a prerequisite a constitu- 
tional amendment. Thus it created a climate of negotiation between Congress 
and the executive that slowed not only the approval of needed economic laws 
but also the degree of adjustment of public sector finances. However, public 
sector accounts improved as a result of the enhancement of tax collection, the 
revenues  coming  from  the  privatization  of  public  enterprises, and  the  ex- 
tremely low level of capital expenditure (see table 5.1).' 
During  1992, the distribution of federal taxes between the federal govern- 
ment and the provinces was affected by a series of laws and decrees aimed at 
providing funds to increase social security payrnenk8  The changes had more 
impact on the provinces that relied heavily on federal funds9  The issue was 
settled with an agreement signed in September that guaranteed for the prov- 
inces a minimum level of funds coming from federal taxes, established limits 
to provincial expenditure increases,  and  financed  with federal government 
funds the increase in social security payments. 
The public sector accounts showed better results in 1993 than in previous 
years thanks to improvement in the overall balance of  the federal government 
and the increasing pace of the privatization program (see table 5.1). Further- 
more, the tax reform continued to have beneficial effects on tax collection lev- 
els, as well as on tax composition; for example, the percentage of value-added 
tax (VAT) and income taxes in the total gross federal fiscal pressure went from 
18.5 percent in 1989 to 48.2 percent in 1993.1° 
In 1994, the combination of public expenditure increase and revenue decline 
worsened public sector accounts (see table 5.1)" 
4.  These bonds have a 10-year maturity date with an IS-month grace period and are repayable 
in quarterly installments with an interest rate equal to the six-month London Interbank Offer Rate. 
5.  E.g., BONEX holdings amounted on average during the first six months of the plan to 0.5 
percent of GDP, which in light of the recent history of the public sector budget deficit was certainly 
an achievement. 
6. A new currency, the convertible peso, began to circulate on  1 January 1992, replacing the 
austral. The replacement rate was  1 convertible peso per 10,OOO australes. 
7. External debt service also contributed to this situation as it experienced relief due to real 
exchange rate appreciation and the downward trend of international interest rates. 
8. The provinces reached the point of  initiating legal action in the Supreme Court of Justice 
regarding these decrees. These modifications were regarded as politically motivated. 
9. The tax distribution change also benefited the Buenos Aires province. 
10. A major step in this direction was the federal fiscal pact signed between the federal govern- 
ment and the provinces, which, among other things, implied the end of the turnover tax, its future 
substitution by a sales tax, and the reduction of employers' social security contributions. 
11. Moreover, the upward trend in international interest rates limited government action regard- 
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In July, a new social security system that would replace the previous public 
pay-as-you-go system became operational. The new Integrated Pension System 
included an optional private capitalized pension system and a public pay-as- 
you-go system. 
To summarize, we could say that the current government, perhaps motivated 
by necessity rather than by ideology, thoroughly addressed the fiscal problem. 
Fiscal policy during this administration attacked several fronts, among others: 
tax revenues, especially tax simplification and evasion; social security reform; 
privatization of state-owned enterprises; rationalization of the central govern- 
ment’s administration; and provincial finances. 
5.2.2  The New Integrated Pension System 
The new Integrated Pension System (IPS) was enacted by law 24.241 on 23 
September 1993 after a long and clumsy legislative process initiated on 2 June 
1992, when the executive sent to the lower house of Congress its proposal to 
reform the social security system.’*  Throughout this process, representatives in- 
troduced several changes into the original version and the executive was obliged 
to accept various political compromises in order to speed up  its approval, 
weakening the effectiveness of the reform. 
The provincial and municipal social security systems were not affected by 
the sanctioned reform, which was designed for the National Social Security 
System.  l3 However, the provinces and the Municipality of Buenos Aires were 
invited to join the new system by the federal pact signed in August 1993. 





Affiliates: Participation is compulsory for dependent15 and self-employed 
workers. 
Retirement age: This was increased to 65 years for men and 60 years for 
women.I6 
Revenues 
A.  Contributions:  l7  The employee’s contribution to  social security was 
raised to 11 percent. The employer’s contribution remained at 16 per- 
cent (see previous percentages in table 5.3). However, it was reduced 
12. For  a detailed treatment of  this legislative process, see Isuani and San Martino (1993, 
13. The National Social Security System provides about 86 percent of Argentina’s total pension 
14. We include here the changes introduced to law 24.241 by the Social Security Solidarity Law 
15. Except for the armed and security forces. 
16. The previous retirement age requirement (men, 60 years; women, 55 years) is to be increased 
gradually until the year 2001. 
17. The law establishes a minimum and a maximum social security taxable base equivalent to 
3 and 60 times the Average Compulsory Pension Contribution (ACPC; Aporte Medio Previsional 
Obligatorio). For details about the ACPC, see n. 22 below. 
1995a. 1995b). 
benefits, see Administraci6n Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSeS 1994,5). 
(24.463). enacted 23 March 1995. 108  Marcel0 F. Altamiranda 
Table 5.3  Contributions  to the Social Security System, 1993 (percent) 
Employee  Employer  Total 
Social Security  10.0  16.0  26.0 
Pensioners’ Health Insurance  3.0  2.0  5.0 
Active Workers’ Health Insurance  3.0  6.0  9.0 
Family Allowances  -  7.5  7.5 
National Employment Fund  -  1.5  1.5 
Total  16.0  33.0  49.0 
Nore: The contribution of self-employed workers was 26 percent calculated on an earnings scale 
for activity categories established by government. Also it was deposited monthly. Notice that this 
is equivalent to fixed-amount monthly payments. 
afterward, following the federal pact, in a differentiated manner for 
some sectors and/or regions of the country.’*  Employees’ contributions 
went to the systems chosen by them, while employers’ contributions 
went in all cases to the public system.I9 
B.  Earmarked taxes: These are entirely destined for the public system and 
consist of the following. 
1. Personal assets tax 
2.  11 percent of the VATzo 
3.  20 percent of the earnings tax net of  the amount allocated to the 
operating expenses of the National Tax Office (Direccidn General 
Impositiva) 
4.  15 percent of coparticipation funds2’ 
the National Budget Law. 
C.  Additional revenues: These are determined annually by  Congress in 
IV.  Public pension system 
A. Basic Universal Pension (BUP; Prestacidn Bisica Universal): Every 
worker has a right to the BUP, but subject to a minimum eligibility 
requirement of  30 years of  contributions. The BUP goes from 27.5 
percent of the average covered wage for 30 years of  contributions to a 
maximum of 3 1.6 percent for 45 years of contributions.22 
18. It is estimated that the average value of  the employer’s  contribution for  1995 was  14.4 
19. The self-employed worker’s contribution was raised to 27 percent, of which 16 percentage 
20. Net of export drawback (tax rebates). 
21. Coparticipation is the scheme for distributing federal taxes between the federal government 
and the provinces. In this case, to obtain the value to which to apply the  15 percent we need to 
deduct from the total amount of  federal taxes that are shared the following items: VAT for social 
security, earnings tax for social security, and a further 16  percent of the earnings tax that is destined 
directly for the provinces. 
22. The BUP is calculated as 2.5 times the ACPC. In turn, the ACPC is calculated twice a year 
(March and September) by dividing total contributions by the number of affiliates, but with a six- 
percent. 
points went to the public system and the rest to the system chosen by the contributing worker. 109  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
B.  Compensatory Pension (CP; Prestaci6n Compensatoria): The CP com- 
pensates workers for past contributions to the old system. It is calcu- 
lated as 1.5 percent of the average indexed covered salary of the past 10 
years before retirement for every year of contribution to the old system, 
with a maximum of  35 years; that is, the highest CP can be 52.5 per- 
cent of said average. Originally, the maximum CP was established at 
one times the ACPC per year computed of contribution to the old sys- 
tem. However, after the promulgation of the Social Security Solidarity 
Law, the role of the ACPC fundamentally changed, and consequently, 
the  same happened to the maximum and minimum pension limits 
based on it. This law stated in its third article: “The National Budget 
law will determine the minimum and maximum amount of the public 
system pensions.” Although there is no practical experience yet with 
the new pension  system, one could anticipate that the limits estab- 
lished by the original law (24.241) will hold inasmuch as they fall in 
the range defined by  the minimum and maximum values that will be 
set by the National Budget Law. 
C.  Additional Public Pension (APP; Prestaci6n Adicional por Permanen- 
cia):23  The APP is for workers who choose to remain in, enter (in the 
case of new active workers), or return to the public  It is calcu- 
lated as 0.85 percent per year of contribution to the new system using 
the same methodology as for the CP. This system also provides disabil- 
ity, survivorship, and advanced age pension benefits. 
V.  Public/private pension system: Workers who choose to join the private 
pension funds managed by  Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs; Admin- 
istradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones) will receive the fol- 
lowing. 
A.  BUP 
B.  CP (if applicable) 
C.  Ordinary Pension (OP; Jubilaci6n Ordinaria): The OP functions as a 
defined-contribution scheme with individual capitalization accounts. 
It will be paid basically either in the form of a life annuity or as sched- 
uled withdrawals based on the cumulative balance of each individual 
month lag. Because the employee’s contribution is  11 percent, one can say that the ACFC will 
amount to 11 percent of the average covered wage, and thus we get the mentioned 27.5 percent. 
Furthermore, since the BUP  will increase by  1 percent for every additional year of contributions 
over 30 years up to a maximum of 45 years, the highest BUP  possible is 31.6 percent of the  average 
covered wage. However, note that as we comment below these maximum and minimum levels and 
their relationship with the ACPC were affected by the Social Security Solidarity Law. 
23. A literal translation of this term would be “Additional Pension for Continuance.” However, 
as new workers entering the labor force also have the choice of  going to the public system and 
receiving this pension, we considered it more appropriate to call it the Additional Public Pension. 
24. The last case refers to workers who, having chosen the private system, want to return to the 
public system. This option will be possible only, according to current legislation, until July 1996. 110  Marcel0 F. Altamiranda 
account. This system also provides disability and survivorship pensions 
in the form of  defined-benefit payments, covered by  group disability 
and term life insurance and paid in the same way as the OP.2s 
VI. Indexation: Public system pensions will be adjusted annually according to 
VII. National guarantee: This guarantee covers the public pension system up to 
National Budget Law guidelines. 
the amount provided for its financing by the National Budget Law. 
5.2.3  The Privatization Program 
The privatization of the public enterprise sector was not only a major com- 
ponent of current government economic reforms but also a core subject of its 
fiscal policy. Traditionally, this sector had an important share of the cash-flow 
public deficit. Moreover, public enterprises had been a key tool for government 
policy related to subsidies, employment, and prices.26 
By  the end of  the  1980s there were about 300 public enterprises, and 90 
percent of  them belonged to the nonfinancial sector. More than half of  these 
firms were under federal jurisdiction and the rest under provincial and munici- 
pal jurisdiction. 
The privatization program gained momentum in the 1990s, becoming ample 
in scope and expeditious in results. This process included sectors such as com- 
munications; commercial aviation; petrochemicals; oil production, refining, 
and distribution; electricity generation and distribution; natural gas transmis- 
sion and distribution; defense; water and sewage; and others.27 
Privatization took the form of  either transfer of  ownership or granting of 
concessions. Moreover, employees remaining on the payroll of the privatized 
firms were eligible to participate in the Employee Ownership Program (Pro- 
grama de Propiedad Participada-PPP)  by means of which they could receive 
a percentage of  the shares of  those companies.28  Additionally, a fraction of 
the privatization revenues was earmarked for the social security system, and 
provincial governments received shares of the restructured oil company, as well 
as a portion of the privatization revenues. 
25. Disability and survivorship benefits for workers who switch to the private system will be 
prorated with the public system in  proportion to the number  of  years of  contribution  to each 
system. 
26. Subsidies were explicit and implicit; i.e., they originated either in government transfers of 
fiscal funds to cover public enterprises’ deficits or in their pricing policies. Employment policies 
included public enterprises’ regular staffing as well as politically nominated managers at several 
levels and political favors in the form of employment positions. The prices of public enterprises 
had been a major tool of most stabilization efforts; in this context, they generally were the first to 
be frozen and the last to be freed. 
27. See Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC 1995b)  for a detailed list. The com- 
munications, oil, electricity, and natural gas sectors constituted the majority of the privatization 
transactions. 
28. The percentage earmarked for employees was in most cases 10 percent, except for those 
companies whose size was too large relative to the number of employees, e.g., the natural gas 
company and hydroelectric power stations. 111  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
Several factors motivated the privatization  policy,  and  certainly, none of 
them alone suffices to explain it. Among these factors we should mention effi- 
ciency; revenues;29  elimination of explicit and implicit subsidies; easing of the 
public debt restraint; signaling to the domestic and international communities 
the political will to reform, modernize, and deregulate the economy; social at- 
titudes toward the “perennial” inefficiency of Argentinean public  enterprise^;^^ 
and  politicians’  time  preferences, which  favored the privatization  revenue 
motive.31 
In table 5.4 we present an overview of the privatization process. Total cash 
proceeds for the period 1990 to October 1994 are estimated at $18.7 billion 
(U.S. dollars). This figure is composed of $9.9 billion cash, $6.2 billion cash- 
equivalent public debt reduction, and $2.7 billion transferred liabilities. The 
face value of  the public debt retired amounted to $14.9 billion, implying an 
average discount of 41 per~ent.~’ 
Argentina’s privatization program revenues-$l8.7  billion-were  concen- 
trated mainly in four sectors: oil (32 percent), electricity (23 percent), tele- 
phones (19 percent), and natural gas (19 percent)-see  table 5.4. 
Table 5.5 shows the breakdown of capital ownership calculated on the basis 
of the net wealth value of the privatized companies. We observe that the federal 
and provincial governments still have stakes in those firms amounting to $5.1 
billion, about 19 percent of the total public net wealth privatized. Notice also 
that concessions represented approximately 50 percent of said net wealth. Fi- 
nally, almost a quarter of the total public net wealth privatized was in the form 
of shares sold in local and foreign markets. 
5.3  TheData 
5.3.1  Population Projections 
We obtained two sets of projections, one from the Argentinean government, 
prepared by  the National Statistics Office (INDEC), and the other from the 
29. Including the increase in taxes paid under private ownership by the new firms created from 
the former state companies. 
30. The government’s inability to control public enterprises; public enterprises’ policy of zero 
investment, even for maintenance-aimed  at controlling the fiscal accounts; and widespread prob- 
lems with public enterprise services were together the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
31. Politicians are in general deemed to have short-term planning horizons. By the 1990s, after 
the two hyperinflation episodes, politicians in Argentina might certainly have had shorter time 
horizons than elsewhere and, accordingly, stronger incentives to maximize immediate fiscal re- 
ceipts. This might help to explain why, motivated by the short-run fiscal benefits, they favored the 
privatization program. See Castelar Pinheiro and Ross Schneider (1995) for a detailed presentation 
of this issue for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
32. Note that total revenues considering the public debt retired at nominal value were $27.5 
billion. In addition, the estimated total net wealth value of the privatized companies was $26.9 
billion, calculating the ownership transfer as if it had been 100 percent. Table 5.4  Privatization Program Results Overview, 1990 to October 1994 (millions of U.S. dollars) 
Sector 
Cash Value  Transferred  Nominal Value  Net Wealth 
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Source: MEyOySP (1995a). 
"Sum of cash; transferred liabilities and nominal value of debt securities. 
Total financial result calculated as if the transfer had been 100 percent. 
'Includes sales of shares for $230.6 million. 
dThe  concessionaire must undertake investments. 
'Includes sales of shares for $520.6 million. 
'Awarded  to bidder that offered the larger discount over the existing residential tariff (26.9 percent). 113  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
Table 5.5  Privatization Program: Capital Ownership in Privatized Companies, 
October 1994 
Net Wealth Value 
Capital Ownership 
U.S. dollars 
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Source: MEyOySP (1995a). 
“Includes transferred liabilities. 
bIncludes the sale of 999 government buildings 
World Bank.33  The government’s projections extend until the year 2050 and are 
available by age range (from ages 0-4  to 80+) and sex every five years starting 
in 1995.  The World Bank‘s projections extend until the year 2150 and are avail- 
able yearly by single age (from age 0 to 75+)  and sex starting in 1995.34 
INDEC’s data are based on more optimistic assumptions about population 
growth that include higher rates of fertility and life expectancy at birth and a 
positive net migration rate for part of the projected period. Thus the total popu- 
lation projected by  INDEC for the year 2050 is 8.7 percent higher than the 
World Bank‘s pr~jection.~~ 
We  chose to use the World Bank’s  projection for Argentina’s generational 
accounts because it covers a longer period of time. However, we  still had to 
extend it until the year 2200 and disaggregate single ages from 75 up to 90+. 
In order to undertake this task we assumed first that fertility and mortality rates 
as well as the age structure after 2150 equal those projected for that year. We 
assumed next that the 1991 age structure for single ages from 75 to 90+ will 
33. See INDEC (1994,1995a. 199%) and Bos et al. (1994). Note that the last population census 
in Argentina took place in 1991. 
34. I wish to thank Eduard Bos from the World Bank for providing special and updated demo- 
graphic tabulations for Argentina and Alejandro Giusti and Albert0 Karmona from INDEC for 
providing the Argentinean government’s projections. 
35. The differences for the male and female population projections are 8.6 and 8.9 percent. 114  Marcelo F. Altamiranda 
Table 5.6  Demographic Projections for Selected Age Ranges and Years 
Population (thousands)  Dependency Ratio (%) 
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11,401 
1  1,427 
















































































































































































































be the same throughout the projection period (INDEC 1993). Population data 
for the base year 1994 were obtained following a similar procedure. 
Table 5.6 contains a summary of the population data. The share in the total 
population of people over age 65 goes from 9.4 percent in 1995 to 25.1 percent 
in 2200, and the dependency ratio goes from 0.17 in  1995 to 0.47 in 2200. 
Thus, while in 1995 there are about six active workers per pensioner, the pro- 
jected figure for 2200 decreases to about two active workers per ~ensioner.~~ 
36. Note also that the share in the total population of people under age 17 decreases from 34.6 
percent in 1995 to 20.9 percent in 2200. 115  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
We  will analyze the impact of this projected  aging of Argentina’s population 
when performing the sensitivity analysis. 
5.3.2 
We excluded from our definition of  the total public sector the municipali- 
ties3*  and social works institutions (obras  so~iales).~~  The main reason for this 
exclusion is that we could not obtain reliable statistics on their revenues. Table 
5.7 presents in detail government revenues and  expenditure^.^" 
When implementing Argentina’s generational accounts, we will impute the 
federal stamp tax and the permanent component of both other taxes and  nontax 
revenues as negative government consumption. Further, we will not consider 
the capital revenues originating from the privatization program; thus we will 
be assuming that they will not be replicated in the future. 
Finally, we estimated government net wealth at -$78.3  billion. This esti- 
mate deducts from the stock of total public debt at the end of December 1994 
($83.4 billion)41  the value of the privatized public enterprises in the hands of 
the federal and provincial governments ($5.1 billion).42 
5.3.3  Tax and Transfer Profiles 
Argentina has a household survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares) that 
is conducted twice a year, May and October, interviewing 4,512 urban house- 
holds located in the capital city, the suburbs, and 26 upcountry  The sur- 
Government Revenues, Consumption, and Net Wealth3’ 
37. I wish to thank Guillermo Banis from Direccion Nacional de Investigaciones y Anilisis 
Fiscal and Cynthia Moskovits and Nuria Susmel from Fundacion de Investigaciones Econ6micas 
Latinoamericanas (FIEL) for providing the data used in this section. 
38. Except for the Buenos Aires province municipality, whose revenues and expenditures in the 
official statistics are reported jointly with those of the provinces themselves. 
39. Social works institutions are mostly private; however, their revenues come from tax pro- 
ceeds. Thus the health services to active workers that they provide should be considered part of 
the government’s health transfers. 
40.  It  should be remarked that unlike public revenues, there is more ample information on 
government expenditures. See Flood, Gasparini, et al. (1994) and Ministerio de Econom‘a y Obras 
y Servicios Wblicos (MEyOySP [1994a], [1994b], [1995b]). We included on the revenue side the 
seigniorage that the government collects on private holdings of money balances. We measured it 
as the change in the nominal M1 stock between December 1994 and December 1993. Note that 
the seigniorage is usually measured by the change in the central bank‘s noninterest bearing liabili- 
ties, i.e., the monetary base. In Argentina, due to the existence of high and remunerated reserve 
requirements, MI is generally used instead of the monetary base to calculate seigniorage. 
41. See MEyOySP, Secretm’a  de Hacienda (1994:IV). We  assumed for the baseline case that 
the debt with pensioners originating from the legally challenged underpayment of pension benefits 
was totally consolidated after the payments made by the government in 1991 and 1993. 
42. See MEyOySP (1995a). Note that we are not considering the value of public infrastructure 
and of public enterprises that are still completely in the government’s hands. Thus we are using a 
sort of net financial wealth measure. As mentioned by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1994), 
this is not a serious omission because we include neither the value of the assets nor the value of 
their implicit rents, and they offset each other. 
43. The sample was selected by  a two-stage probabilistic process. Its starting size of  6,328 
households reduces to 4,512 once uninhabited households and households that did not want to 
participate are discounted. For details, see INDEC (1990, n.d.). 
The 26 upcountry cities include almost all provincial capital cities. The surveyed areas contain 
about 60 percent of Argentina’s population. 116  Marcel0 F. Altamiranda 
Table 5.7  Total Public Sector: Revenues and Expenditures, 1994 
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Sources: MEyOySP ([  1994b], [  1995bl); Direcci6n Nacional de Investigaciones y Anllisis Fiscal 
(National Direction of Fiscal Research and Analysis); FEL. 
Nore; Exchange rate used throughout chapter is 1 peso per U.S. dollar. 
-Privatization cash revenues. 
bIncludes Pensioners Institute (PAMI). 
cother  benefits include discounts on utilities and public transportation and waiver of municipal 
taxes for certain pension-income groups, burial subsidy, etc. 
vey  covers six topics, gathering demographic, employment, migratory, hous- 
ing, educational, and income information. 
Income  data  is  net  of  taxes  and  social  security  contributions. Income 
sources, differentiated in the questionnaire but not reported, are wage, self- 
employment, profits, rents, return on financial assets, dividends, pensions, and 
other. Income is used in the survey mainly to classify other information in 
order to assess the population's socioeconomic situation. Several tables using 
income in this manner are published; however, data by  age and sex are not 
released. Nevertheless, with access to the database, it is possible to cross-match 
publicly available information on sex and age from the family questionnaires 117  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
Table 5.8  Tax and Transfer Profiles 
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West Germany’s VAT  14% 
West Germany’s excise 
West Germany’s excise 
Thailand’s import duties 




Argentina’s pension payments 
Argentina’s pension payments 
New Zealand’s health 
New Zealand‘s education 
New Zealand‘s housing 
and income from the individual questionnaires. From this information we were 
able to construct income profiles.44 
It is important to remark that the problem associated with income informa- 
tion obtained by any survey in Argentina is under/overstatement by the partici- 
pants. Moreover, income data are in general questioned on statistical signifi- 
cance grounds, and government officials frequently claim that this is the reason 
they are not published regularly. We  tried to ameliorate these problems by 
working with a weighted average of series from three consecutive ~urveys.4~ 
Regarding transfers, the only available figures are the average pension pay- 
ments by age range and sex constructed by the social security secretary of  the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. From these figures we constructed the 
average profiles. 
Table 5.8 summarizes the assignment of profiles. In the case of  taxes and 
transfers that did not have profiles available to assign we used those for similar 
44. In Argentina individual information from the questionnaires is confidential by  law. For this 
reason, access to the database is restricted and the information provided is limited. 
It was not possible to obtain income information disaggregated by source. I wish to thank Silvia 
Montoya and Andris Tcach from IEERAL-Fundacibn Mediterrinea for providing the income data 
by  age and sex used to construct these profiles. Note that we are talking about average profiles 
across all members of the generation alive in the base year. 
45. The average is weighted by the number of observations. 118  Marcelo F. Altamiranda 
concepts available for other countries that have had generational accounts per- 
formed to date.46 
5.3.4  Labor and Capital Income Tax 
The net  income tax  is levied  on companies, individuals, and  undivided 
states’ earnings. It can be considered, in practice, a tax on labor and capital in- 
come. Although only the total revenue figure is reported ($5.82 billion for 
1994), 62 percent of it can be classified as tax on capital income-specifically 
on individual capital income and corporate profits. 
As explained, we  have  neither profiles for capital and labor income taxes 
nor profiles for capital and labor income separately. However, as we can differ- 
entiate between capital and labor income tax revenues, we will consider these 
taxes separately in the calculation of  the baseline generational accounts and 
use Argentina’s total income profile to allocate them.47  We  will also perform a 
sensitivity experiment using the U.S. capital income tax profile and Argentina’s 
total income profile for capital income tax and labor income tax, respectively. 
Additionally, we  will analyze within the latter sensitivity experiment the 
impact of the capital income tax adjustment. This adjustment accounts for the 
fact that taxes on capital income require the consideration of factors that imply 
differential tax treatment of new relative to existing capital assets. 
Using the formula derived by Auerbach et a1.,48 we estimate that the 1994 
flow of capital income taxes overstated the capital income tax burden on new 
investment by $0.285 billion and that the capitalized value of excess taxes on 
existing assets amounts to $40.7 billion.49  These figures are calculated by mul- 
tiplying the value of the capital stock ($503.3 billion)50  by our estimates of the 
correction from average to effective tax rates (0.057 percent) and of the tax- 
based discount on existing assets (8.1 percent). These calculations are based 
on the following data: (1) investor’s marginal tax rate, 28 percent; (2) investor’s 
required after-tax return, 4 percent; (3) investment economic rate of deprecia- 
tion, 5 percent; (4) investment growth rate, 3.3 percent; and (5) inflation rate, 
4 per~ent.~’ 
46. I wish to thank Jan Walliser for providing these profiles. 
47. Note that this experiment is in line with the adjustment suggested by  Fehr and Kotlikoff 
48. See Auerbach et al. (1991,67-69  and appendix) for a detailed exposition of this method. 
49. In the sensitivity experiment, we  subtract the $0.285 billion  figure from current capital 
income taxes and assign the $40.7 billion amount as a one-time tax to 1994 cohorts according to 
the corresponding profile. 
50. The value of Argentina’s total capital stock for 1994 is $909.2 billion. This figure includes 
capital equipment, residential capital, industrial buildings and structures, and public infrastructure. 
We deducted the amounts that correspond to public infrastructure (27 percent of the total) and to 
owner-occupied housing (17.6 percent of the total) in order to estimate the value of capital stock 
used for the capital income tax adjustment. The first figure is based on FIEL‘s estimations, and the 
second assumes, based on data from the population census (see INDEC 1995b), that 84 percent 
of residential capital is occupied by owners. 
5 1. The investment economic rate of depreciation (3) corresponds to the annual average depreci- 
ation rate of the capital stock considered; the investment growth rate (4) corresponds to the annual 
average capital growth rate. 
(chap. 3 in this volume) for a small open economy. 119  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
Table 5.9  Generational  Accounts: Central Assumptions (present values in 
thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Net Payment 
Generation’s 

















































































Note:  Central assumptions are a growth rate of  1.5 percent and a discount rate of  5 percent. 
5.3.5 
On top of the central assumptions used in this book, we will analyze a partic- 
ular baseline case for Argentina that assumes an 8 percent discount rate and a 
1 percent growth rate. This real discount rate is between the real internal rate 
of return on the BONEX 89 and the real prime lending rate in U.S. dollars, 
both for 1994; and the productivity growth rate is in line with the evolution of 
average productivity during the past two decades. 
Discount and Productivity Growth Rates 
5.4  Basic Findings and Sensitivity Analysis 
5.4.1  Basic Results 
Tables 5.9 through 5.12 present 1994 generational accounts for the central 
assumptions and the special baseline cases. These tables were constructed, as 
said above, for real discount rates (r)  of 5 and 8 percent and growth rates (g) 
of  1.5 and 1 percent and under the assumption of no social security reform.52 
The rationale for the latter assumption is that the new IPS became operational 
52. All 1994 dollar values were expressed in 1995 dollars using the US.  CPI. Table 5.10  Composition of Generational Accounts: Central Assumptions (present value of receipts and payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Capital  Excise, 
Labor  Income  Fuel, and  Social  Social 
Generation’s  Net  Income  andAssets  Electricity  Security  Provincial  Security 























13.9  1.4 
15.7  1.6 
20.3  2.0 
26.3  2.4 
30.8  2.6 
31.6  2.9 
28.2  2.9 
21.6  2.8 
12.6  2.6 
1.5  2.2 
-11.3  1.9 
-25.2  1.4 
-39.9  1.1 
-42.9  0.9 
-43.0  0.7 
-41.2  0.6 
-34.3  0.4 
-32.5  0.3 









































12.9  3.2 
13.0  3.7 
13.7  4.4 
14.1  5.2 
13.5  5.7 
13.6  5.9 
13.1  5.9 
12.6  5.4 
12.2  4.9 
11.3  4.3 
10.2  3.6 
8.9  3.1 
7.6  2.5 
6.1  1.9 
4.5  1.3 
3.4  1 .o 
2.3  0.6 
1.9  0.5 







































6.1  11.0  3. I 
7. I  12.5  2.8 
8.5  15.0  3.1 
10.1  17.0  3.4 
11.4  19.2  3.4 
12.5  23.3  3.6 
12.6  27.0  3.7 
12.0  31.1  3.8 
11.0  36.0  3.8 
9.6  41.3  3.9 
7.8  46.8  4.0 
6.3  53.9  4.1 
5.1  62.8  4.3 
4.  I  59.9  4.5 
3.2  55.6  4.0 
2.5  49.9  4.1 
1.7  40.2  3. I 
1.4  36.8  2.9 







































Note:  Central assumptions are a growth rate of 1.5 percent and a discount rate of 5 percent. 121  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 





















































































Note: Special baseline assumptions are a growth rate of  1 percent and a discount rate of 8 percent. 
by  law on  15 July  1994. Thus, not only because of  the nature of the reform 
implied by the IPS but also because of the way in which it took place, we can 
safely assume that the fiscal statistics of  1994 do not reflect any major change 
due to it. 
Afterward, we will simulate a case that assumes the social security reform 
fully operational. In this way, comparing the two cases, we will be able to study 
the effects on generational accounts of the social security reform. 
The accounts in tables 5.9 and 5.11 indicate the average amount an individ- 
ual belonging to a specific age cohort will pay in net taxes (net payment) over 
the rest of his or her life. For example, under the central assumptions the pro- 
jected  present  value  net payments  of  40-year-old  individuals  are $12,600, 
$28,800, and -$2,800  for the total, males, and females, respectively. The cor- 
responding  values for the  special baseline  case are $19,300,  $31,100,  and 
Moreover, these tables show that net payments present a life cycle pattern, 
53. The difference in net payments between males and females arises because the latter earn 
less and therefore pay less income taxes and social security contributions. Table 5.12  Composition of Generational  Accounts: Special Baseline (present value of receipts and payments in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Capital  Excise, 
Labor  Income  Fuel, and  Social  Social 
Generation’s  Net  Income  andAssets  Electricity  Security  Provincial  Security 























5.1  0.4 
6.4  0.5 
10.5  0.7 
16.5  1.1 
23.4  1.4 
27.1  1.7 
27.1  1.9 
24.5  1.9 
19.3  1.7 
11.6  1.6 
1.6  1.3 
-10.5  1.0 
-25.8  0.9 
-31.2  0.7 
-33.9  0.6 
-34.3  0.5 
-30.1  0.3 
-29.8  0.3 









































6.5  0.9 
6.7  1.3 
7.3  1.9 
7.8  2.7 
7.8  3.2 
8.0  3.6 
7.9  3.8 
1.9  3.6 
8.0  3.4 
7.8  3.1 
7.3  2.7 
6.6  2.4 
5.9  2.0 
4.9  1.5 
3.7  1.1 
2.9  0.8 
2.1  0.6 
I .6  0.5 
0.4  0. I 






































1.7  I .2  1.5 
2.4  I .6  1.1 
3.4  2.3  1.3 
4.7  3.1  1.5 
6.3  4.1  1.5 
7.5  5.8  1.7 
8.0  7.8  1.9 
8.0  10.6  2.0 
7.6  14.5  2.1 
6.9  19.4  2.2 
5.8  24.8  2.4 
4.7  32.4  2.6 
3.9  43.8  2.9 
3.3  45.1  3.4 
2.7  44.6  3.2 
2.2  41.8  3.5 
I .5  35.3  2.7 
I .3  33.8  2.7 







































Note:  Special baseline assumptions are a growth of  1 percent and a discount rate of  8 percent 123  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
characterized by younger generations making positive payments to the govern- 
ment over their remaining lifetimes and older generations being net beneficia- 
ries of government transfers. Note that under the central assumptions, males 
aged 50 or older and females aged 40 or older have negative generational ac- 
counts; that is, in present value they can expect to receive more from future 
transfers than they pay in  The change of  sign in the generational ac- 
counts occurs at age 55 for males and age 50 for females in the special base- 
line case. 
Tables 5.10 and 5.12 present in detail the present values of each of the vari- 
ous tax payments and transfer receipts. From them, we can further qualify 40- 
year-old total net payments. In the central assumption case, the generational 
account ($12,600) reflects the difference between total projected present value 
of tax payments ($54,500) and total projected present value of future transfers 
($41,700)?  For the special baseline assumptions these figures are $19,300, 
$37,300, and $18,100. 
In addition, we estimate that under the central assumptions newborn genera- 
tions in 1994 will pay $13,900 in present value over their entire lifetimes while 
future generations will pay a (estimated) growth-adjusted amount of $24,300, 
which is about 75 percent larger. The corresponding amounts for newborn and 
future generations in the special baseline case are $5,100 and $12,700, with an 
imbalance of  146 percent. These differences indicate that-in  both cases- 
under our assumptions regarding Argentina’s fiscal policy, there is a huge gen- 
erational imbalance. This imbalance implies that future Argentinean genera- 
tions will have to pay on average net taxes that are l .8 to 2.5 times larger, after 
adjusting for growth, than the ones current generations are estimated to pay if 
they continue to be subject to the 1994 fiscal policy for the rest of their lives. 
5.4.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
Discount and Growth Rates 
In table 5.13 we present the percentage difference between newborns’ and 
future generations’ net payments for different combinations of  discount rate 
and growth rate. As the table indicates, the extent of the generational imbalance 
is quite sensitive to discount and growth rate assumptions. For discount rates 
larger than 5 percent we observe that the larger the discount rate the larger the 
difference between accounts of current and future generations, while the effect 
of growth rates does not show a clear trend. Thus, according to these results, 
future generations of  Argentineans will pay,  in present value, net taxes that 
range from 1.7 to 7.5 times the amount 1994 newborn Argentineans are ex- 
pected to pay, given the current policy. Note that all the combinations confirm 
the imbalance of Argentina’s fiscal policy. 
54. Note that social security benefits are the main factor that explains the change in sign of the 
55. Here and in similar comments below, differences are due to rounding off. 
generational accounts. Table 5.13  SensitivityAnalysis:  Net Tax Payments of Newborn and Future Generations (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
g = 0.5  g=1 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=9  r=  11  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=8  r=9  r=  11 
Present generation  16.5  10.8  6.0  3.2  1.6  17.0  12.3  7.0  5.1  3.8  2.0 
Future generations  30.9  18.9  13.4  11.8  12.3  35.0  21.4  14.3  12.7  11.9  12.1 
Generational 
imbalance (%)  88.3  76.2  123.4  272.3  645.3  105.4  73.7  104.0  146.1  217.0  508.8 
g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=9  r=  11  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=9  r=  11 
Present generation  16.5  13.9  8.2  4.4  2.4  13.8  15.3  9.6  5.2  2.8 
Future generations  39.0  24.3  15.6  12.2  11.9  42.5  21.7  17.3  12.7  11.8 
Generational 
imbalance (%)  137.3  74.8  90.1  174.6  402.0  207.8  79.7  80.9  142.4  318.6 125  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
This table also shows that the sizes of generational accounts are sensitive to 
the values assumed for the discount and growth rates. The sizes of generational 
accounts are lower in absolute value the higher the discount rate. For growth 
rates the relationship again is not as clear. 
Other Assumptions 
Table 5.14 presents sensitivity results for changes in several assumptions. 
This analysis is performed for the central assumptions and the special base- 
line case. 
The first experiment analyzes the case that uses the U.S. profile for the capi- 
tal income tax. Although the size of the generational imbalance is sensitive to 
this change of profile, our conclusion that Argentina’s fiscal accounts show a 
huge generational imbalance is robust to it. Then the inframarginal capital in- 
come tax adjustment is performed,56  resulting in a reduction of the generational 
imbalance. Nevertheless, the size of  this imbalance is still very significant. 
Finally, this adjustment is examined for the case that uses Argentina’s total 
income tax profile for the capital income tax, with similar results. 
The second experiment considers the effects of assuming no future demo- 
graphic change will occur in Argentina; that is, we assume the population age 
distribution will be constant after 1994. This experiment helps to explain the 
impact of the aging process, the main feature of the Argentinean population’s 
future development. The conclusion is that if the population structure were to 
remain constant, younger generations would be better off and the generational 
imbalance would be significantly smaller in the central assumption case and 
smaller, though still huge, in the special baseline case.57 
Third, we analyze the impact of government debt. If we assume no govern- 
ment debt, the generational imbalance is much smaller in the central assump- 
tion case, while in the special baseline case the reduction is so important that 
the imbalance changes sign and is in absolute value almost the same as for the 
central assumptions. 
The last sensitivity test studies the impact of considering government educa- 
tional expenditure as part of  government consumption instead of  a transfer. 
This increases the burden of the newborn generation relative to future genera- 
tions and, thus, reduces the imbalance in both cases, though more in the special 
baseline case. 
56. The adjustment calculated here was  intended  as a maximum. This is due mainly to  the 
assumed level of  the investor’s required after-tax return, which is low in view of the high risk that 
international investors still assign to Argentina. Note that a 10  percent after-tax return implies a 
capitalized value of excess taxes on existing assets of about $10 billion. 
57. Note that in  the cases where the population structure is not constant, younger generations 
will bear the fiscal burden of the demographic change. Table 5.14  Sensitivity Analysis: Other Assumptions (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Central Assumptions  Special Baseline 
Generational  Generational 
Present  Future  Imbalance  Present  Future  Imbalance 
Generation  Generations  (%)  Generation  Generations  (“/.I 
Base case  13.9  24.3  74.8  5.1  12.7  146.1 
Capital income tax 
U.S.  profile  13.6  23.3  72.1  4.9  12.3  149.8 
US.  profile and inframarginal adjustment  13.5  21.6  61.2  4.9  8.2  68.7 
Argentina total income profile and 
inframarginal adjustment  13.7  22.5  63.9  5.1  8.6  68.8 
Population structure  14.7  15.0  1.7  4.6  10.2  119.8 
Zero debt  13.9  19.6  41  .o  5.1  3.2  -38.0 
Government educational expenditure as 
government consumption  22.7  36.1  58.6  10.9  20.1  84.4 127  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
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”The required adjustment for all taxes including the seigniorage is 8.4 percent. 
hIncludes  pensions and other benefits; see table 5.7. 
5.5  The Generational Impact of Alternative Policies 
5.5.1  Impact of Policies Needed to Achieve Generational Balance 
In this section we will calculate the magnitude of the immediate and perma- 
nent increase in alternative tax revenues, or reduction in alternative transfers 
or government expenditure, required to achieve generational balance (or inter- 
temporal budget balance).58  Note that these adjustments are alternative ways to 
evaluate the size of the generational imbalance. 
In tables 5.15 and 5.16 we present a list of alternative policies, relative to 
our central assumptions and baseline projected time path of revenues and ex- 
penditures, required to restore Argentina’s generational balance. For example, 
in the special baseline case of the VAT an increase in revenues of 22.8 percent 
is required for this purpose.59 It is important to remark  that the adjustment 
needed is in revenues and that the target can be attained not only by increasing 
the average taxation rate but also by reducing the degree of tax evasion, or by 
a mix of both effects.60 
The list of  policies also considers increases in all taxes, in social security 
contributions, in provincial  taxes,  and in  different combinations  of  income 
taxes, as well as reductions in all transfers, social security benefits, and govern- 
ment consumption. The magnitude of the required adjustments is, obviously, 
associated with the weight of the policy instrument chosen within total reve- 
58. Note that this is a partial equilibrium statement. In other words, it ignores the effect that 
changes in taxes, transfers, or government expenditure might have on the country’s economic per- 
formance, as well as the feedback impact of any modification of this performance on said vari- 
ables. 
59. Note that this huge increase in VAT revenues, equivalent in 1994 to 1.3 percent of GDP, will 
just restore generational balance. 
60.  Tax evasion still plays a crucial role in Argentina’s fiscal accounts. 128  Marcel0 F.  Altamiranda 
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“The  required adjustment for all taxes including the seigniorage is 6.5 percent. 
bIncludes pensions and other benefits; see table 5.7. 
nues or expenditures. Furthermore, while the impact on future generations is 
fairly similar whichever policy instrument is used, the distribution of the addi- 
tional net payment burden across current generations is sensitive to the choice 
of tax or transfer instrument. 
One interesting feature to note is that the huge Argentinean  generational 
imbalance is associated with adjustments needed for certain policy instruments 
that are not reasonable. In this sense, for example, the increases in labor or 
capital income taxes alone are certainly not feasible. Likewise, the increases 
required for provincial taxes, social security contributions, and VAT  are huge 
enough to raise doubts about the reasonability of applying them in practice. 
Thus we are left with few choices, mainly social security benefits and gov- 
ernment consumption.61  Regarding these instruments, on the one hand, the so- 
cial security benefits issue was already addressed by current economic authori- 
ties with the social security reform, and we will analyze it below. On the other 
hand, the huge reduction needed in government consumption, about 1.3 per- 
cent of  GDP in  1994, needs further qualification. First, government expen- 
diture in Argentina proved to be extremely-“politically”-rigid  downward 
even after the numerous  “announcements”  of  reductions and reforms made 
by the current government. Second, our concept of government consumption 
includes primarily salaries, and thus its required reduction implies a drastic 
head count cutback. Third, the social consequences of such adjustment should 
be taken into consideration, and a comprehensive program would unquestion- 
ably be required. Finally, expenditure reductions applied to provincial finances 
would have to take into account their individual situations and would imply 
complicated political maneuvers; their net impact is difficult to assess.62 
61. Note that we are also implicitly discarding either increases of taxes or decreases of transfers 
across the board. 
62. The scope of this problem is well beyond the limits of our work. However, the issue is 
highlighted here to remark the difficulties of the aggregate policy adjustment required to attain 129  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
5.5.2 
In terms of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint we have two 
effects of the privatization program: first, a change in government net wealth- 
equation (1); second, a variation in the present value in year t of all future net 
tax payments-equation  (2): 
Generational Account Effects of the Privatization Program 
AWP  =  AAP- ALP, 
where AWF  is change in government net wealth in year t due to the sale of 
public enterprises. AAY is change in government assets in year t;  this term will 
decrease by the value of the public companies sold and increase by any cash 
withheld by the government. ALY  is change in government liabilities in year t; 
this term will decrease by the value of the repaid public debt. 
where ml,k  is change in total net payments to the government, NIY is net pay- 
ments to the government under private ownership of public enterprises, and 
N;O  is net payments to the government under government ownership of pub- 
lic enterprises. 
Equation (2)  captures the elimination of explicit and implicit public enter- 
prise subsidies when they are privatized, as well as the difference in future 
taxes and dividends paid to the government by these companies under the dis- 
tinct ownership-type assumptions. The latter concept includes not only taxes 
paid by the privatized firms that were not paid before by these companies (for 
whatever reason) when they were under government ownership but also the 
increase in taxes and dividends due to the change in the profitability and scale 
of the new private  enterprise^.^^ 
Estimation of the total effect of the privatization program as measured by 
equations (1) and (2)  is not possible with the available statistical data, espe- 
cially in the case of  equation (2).  For this reason, we will only address the 
change in government net wealth associated with this program. 
First, considering that by 1994 most of this process had already been con- 
cluded,  we  can assume that both the net tax payment and government net 
wealth impacts were by that time included in the fiscal accounts. In this sense, 
our calculation of Argentina’s generational accounts has taken care of these 
effects, and they are also included in the generational imbalance found. 
generational balance. Consider, e.g.,  that currently there are no reliable statistics on provincial fi- 
nances. 
63. Note that when we set up Argentina’s generational accounts we did not address either the 
efficiency of the government’s transfers or of its current expenditure because they were beyond 
the scope of our work. Similarly, we are not evaluating the effect of the change in the quality of 
services provided by  the privatized firms vis-514s the former state enterprises. Furthermore, we 
will not attempt to measure the impact of other aspects of the privatization program, such as the 
increase in market competition, technological improvements, the adequacy of  the price paid for 
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Second, we  can isolate in the generational accounts the government net 
wealth impact from the rest by  means of the following reasoning. If  all the 
privatization revenues had been used to cancel outstanding public debt, this 
impact would have been zero; otherwise it would have been negative, implying 
a reduction in government net wealth.”  The problem is that changes in the 
stock of public debt also respond to other causes. We  propose to sort out this 
problem by  ascribing all the estimated reduction in the stock of public debt 
during the period under analysis to the privatization program. Then, comparing 
the net wealth value of the state firms sold less the current government’s share 
of them with our estimate of the reduction in the stock of public debt, we will 
obtain the effect on government net wealth. Finally, incorporating this effect 
into the generational accounts, we  will be able to calculate its impact on the 
size of the generational imbalance.65 
In  table 5.17 we present the stock of public debt at the beginning of  the 
current administration and for our baseline year.  The nonconsolidated debt 
figure for 1989 includes debt with pensioners, suppliers, and other creditors 
originated and accrued before that year,66  while the figure for  1994 encom- 
passes the estimated public debt pending consolidation by then.67  We  obtain 
an estimated total reduction in the stock of public debt for the period 1989-94 
of $11.8 billion dollars by  comparing total figures (in 1994 dollars) for these 
years. 
The estimated net wealth value of the public enterprises that the government 
sold net of  the current government’s share of  them amounts to $21.8 billion 
(see table 5.5). Thus the negative effect on government net wealth is $9.98 
billion. 
Subsequently, we need to plug this last figure into our accounts to calculate 
its impact on the generational imbalance. As said before, this effect was al- 
ready included in our calculations, so for our purposes we will need to simulate 
an increase instead of a reduction in government net wealth. 
The result of this simulation is that future generations will pay to the govern- 
ment (estimated) growth-adjusted arnountP of $23,800 (central assumptions) 
and $11,600 (special baseline) in net taxes, which are about 70.7 and 124 per- 
cent larger than the net payments of newborn generations. These figures com- 
pare with our base-case outcomes: $24,300 and $12,700; 74.8 and 146.1 per- 
64. We can safely assume that the government did not withhold any privatization cash revenues. 
65. Note that  the  privatization’s net  wealth impact is analyzed with reference to a country’s 
generational imbalance that already includes the (most likely positive) net tax payment effect of 
this program. 
66. The public debt figures exclude provinces and public (government owned and managed) 
hanks-except  for the central bank. The current government began to consolidate previously origi- 
nated and accrued public debt as of April 1991. 
67. We  assume for  1994 the  same amount Melconian and  Santhngelo ([1996]) assumed for 
1995. We also adopt their criterion regarding the nonconsolidated debt; i.e.,  this debt is considered 
as debt of the period when it was accrued but for the value that it was consolidated. 
68. Generational account currency figures are  in 1995 dollars. 131  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
Table 5.17  Stock of Public Debt (billions of U.S. dollars; end of December) 
Debt  1989  1994 
Registered public debt 
Nonconsolidated public debt 
Public enterprises liabilities 
Foreign exchange adjustment 
Other 
Total 
Total in 1994 U.S. dollars 














Sources: IMF, International Financial Sturistics, annual volume (Washington, D.C., 1995); Mel- 
conian and Santingelo ([  19961); MEyOySP, Secretan’a de Hacienda, Bolefin  Fiscal, annual volume 
(Buenos Aires, 1995). 
Note:  To  express the 1989 public debt in 1994 US.  dollars we  adjusted the index used by  Mel- 
conian and Santingelo ([1996]) by  the U.S. inflation rate, producer prices, during 1995. 
cent. Thus the negative effect on government net wealth of  the privatization 
program net of its contribution to government tax revenues implied increases 
in Argentina’s generational imbalance of 2 and 10 percent, re~pectively.~~ 
5.5.3  Generational Effects of the Social Security Reform 
In this section, we will set up a theoretical case in which the social security 
reform is fully functional as of  1994. In this way, we will be able to analyze 
whether the reduction in social security expenditures associated with the re- 
form could be enough to restore generational balance or whether additional 
austere fiscal policies are required. The need for additional policies in this the- 
oretical case will certainly reinforce the need for such policies in the actual 
case, which will produce its eventual benefits gradually and further in the fu- 
ture. 
Our strategy will be first to determine the government’s total debt with cur- 
rent pensioners. Then we will aim at finding out what should be the reduction 
in pension payments needed to restore generational balance and at appraising 
its empirical feasibility as single fiscal policy 
In other words, we are making explicit the government’s implicit liabilities 
with current pensioners. Therefore, the resulting reduction in pension pay- 
ments required to restore generational balance will have  two parts: one re- 
quired to restore the original imbalance and the other to match the increase in 
public debt generated by this reclassification of liabilities. 
In order to estimate the actuarial debt, which is the main component of the 
69. From 70.7 to 74.8 percent and from 124 to 146.1 percent, respectively. 
70. Note that first we will add the burden of the total debt with current pensioners to our base- 
case generational accounts, and then we will analyze the reduction in pension payments needed to 
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government's total debt with current pensioners,  we make the following as- 
sumptions: (1) debt is discounted and adjusted for growth in the same way as 
our central assumption or special baseline case generational accounts; (2)  the 
base-year relationship between total payments obtained from the data of the 
social security secretary of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security with both 
total payments of  the National  Social Security System and the Total Social 
Security System is assumed constant thro~ghout;~'  and (3) as we do not have 
pension payment data by single ages, we will make additional assumptions on 
the number of  future years during which each cohort will receive these pay- 
ment~.~*  Our estimates of the actuarial debt amounts are $160.1 billion for the 
central assumption case and $125.8 billion for the baseline case.73 
Another element of the total debt with current pensioners, though a minor 
component compared with our previous figure, is the amount originating from 
legal actions taken by them against the g~vernment.~~  We will assume that the 
$5.0 billion of nonconsolidated public debt estimated in the preceding section 
all corresponds to debt with current pensioners of the kind just described. We 
consider that this is most likely the case because the majority or perhaps the 
totality of public debt with suppliers and other creditors accrued before  1989 
should have been consolidated by  1994.75 
Consequently, adding these two components we obtain our estimates of the 
total debt with current pensioners. These estimates, for the cases under analy- 
sis, are $165.1 billion and $130.8 billion. 
Next, we plug these debt figures as liabilities into government net wealth 
and run the policy experiment that entails reducing pension payments while 
maintaining social security contributions at their baseline level to restore gen- 
erational balance.76  The needed reductions are 33.5 and 47.8 percent for the 
cases under analysis. 
71. The Total Social Security System includes the National Social Security System, provincial 
and municipal social security systems, and other activity-specific social security systems. The 
base-year relationships mentioned in assumption 2 are 71 and 87 percent, respectively. See Cristini 
(1995) and FIEL-Consejo  Empresario Argentino (1995). 
72. Specifically, we will assume that (I) 0-18-year-old  pensioners will be paid until they are 18 
years old; (2)  18-85-year-old  pensioners  will be paid until they are 80 years old in the case 
of  males and until they are 85 years old in the case of females; and (3) 80+-year-old males and 
85+-year-old  females will be paid only for one year. 
73. FIEL estimates this debt at $140.9 billion using a 4 percent discount rate and not adjusting 
for growth. This figure is in line with our estimations provided we take into account the different 
discount rate and growth rate assumptions. See FIEL-Consejo  Empresario Argentino (1993, in 
1994 dollars. 
74. This is the debt with pensioners pending consolidation originated by the legally challenged 
underpayment of pension benefits. 
75. If we only include this debt in our baseline accounts the results change in the following 
manner: the generational imbalance increases from 74.8 to 77.1 percent in the central assumption 
case, and from 146 to 158 percent in the special baseline case. 
76. The item of the fiscal accounts database that we are reducing is pensions and other benefits. 
It encompasses pension payments; benefits such as discounts on utilities and public transportation, 
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These reductions seem likely to suffice as single fiscal policy if we consider 
that by  1995 a third of all social security affiliates were in the public pension 
system and the rest were in the mixed (publidprivate) system. However, a more 
detailed analysis of the data may lead us to a completely different conclusion. 
First, consider, for example, that the percentage reduction required in our 
baseline case implies annual pension and other benefit payments of $10.3 bil- 
lion. Then assume that the government pays the BUP to all pensioners, that is, 
that the new  IPS is fully functional. The total annual BUP payment will be 
about $8.4 billion.77  The remaining funds, net of overhead expenses,78  are $1.5 
billion and seem scarcely enough for the government to be able to meet the rest 
of its social security commitments. These commitments are the other benefits 
classified under social security expenditures and the payments to workers who 
chose the public system, namely, the APP and the disability, survivorship, and 
advanced age pension 
Therefore, this conclusion reinforces the need for additional austere fiscal 
policies to complement the social security reform and restore generational bal- 
ance. In addition, it highlights the fact that considering government fiscal pro- 
grams separately may be misleading. In other words, the social security system 
may attain balance or even a small surplus as a result of the reform; however, 
this is not enough to guarantee the balance of the overall government intertem- 
poral budget. 
Along this same line of thought, it is important to remark that 58.2 percent 
of the funds deposited with PFAs by the end of  1995 were invested in public 
bonds (see Superintendencia de Administradoras 1995). Therefore, the reform 
channeled workers’ social security contributions to the private PFA funds, and 
these institutions, in turn, used more than half of the funds to purchase govern- 
ment bonds. This process provided additional government borrowing that will 
be used over time to meet public expenditures, among them the pension bene- 
fits of  retirees who opted for the public system, as well as the BUP of  all 
retirees. In government intertemporal budget terms the present value of  net 
taxes was reduced but the public debt was  increased, and thus, as Kotlikoff 
(1994) points out, it amounts to a “change of words,” specifically social secu- 
expenses associated with all these payments. The details of  this item are not published in  the 
official statistics, but we estimate that pension payments are 90 percent or more of it. 
Note that maintaining social security contributions at their baseline level is in line with the 
change introduced in Article 13 of the Social Security Solidarity Law. This article established that 
social security contributions could be reduced only if their reduction was offset by  an increase in 
the collection of other taxes or by transfers from the Treasury. 
77. This assumes a total number of affiliates of 3.8 million; an ACPC of $63 (this was actually 
the value of the ACPC from April to December 1994);  and an average BUP of 2.7 times the ACPC. 
Consider also that there are 13 pension payments during the year, 12 monthly payments and an 
extra payment paid half in July and half in December. 
78. We estimate annual overhead expenses of $0.4 billion. See FIEL-Consejo  Empresario Ar- 
gentino (1995). 
79. Similar reasoning applies to the central assumption accounts. 134  Marcel0 F. Altamiranda 
rity contributions are changed-partially-into  loans to the government (see 
also Kotlikoff, chap. 1 in this volume).80  Note that this “change of  words” is 
also applicable to our above reclassification of government liabilities. 
Another characteristic of the PFA portfolio composition that needs  to be 
highlighted, although it is not the object of our present analysis, is the low per- 
centage participation of investments  in foreign markets. Specifically, by  the 
end of 1995, only 0.8 percent of the funds deposited with PFAs were invested 
in foreign government bonds and 0.6 percent in foreign securities (see Superin- 
tendencia de Administradoras 1995). This situation was caused mainly by the 
influence of government regulations and incentives oriented toward fostering 
domestic savings and protecting investors, justified by the standard arguments 
associated with developing countries’ capital market characteristics.81  The cost 
of this policy is that Argentinean investors do not benefit from the reduced risk 
associated with international diversification of their portfolios. 
The other economic changes associated with the social security reform pro- 
cess, whose analysis requires the utilization of a more comprehensive model, 
are beyond the scope of this work. However, we will briefly consider some of 
their likely implications from Argentina’s perspective.82 
In Argentina, before the introduction of the IPS, the perceived linkage be- 
tween social security benefits and contributions was practically zero; that is, 
workers regarded contributions entirely as a marginal tax on their labor supply. 
Furthermore, ever escalating inflation, together with the government’s constant 
manipulation of the indexes used to adjust pension payments and policies that 
diverted social security funds to other purposes, may have resulted in very low 
actual linkage.83  Thus, concerning the benefit-tax linkage, chances should be 
high that the reform will bring about an efficiency gain. However, given the 
profound impact that the social security crisis had on workers this effect will 
probably be gradual. 
In addition, Argentina has nonregistered employment in the so-called infor- 
mal sector of the economy that is estimated at about 20 percent of total em- 
ployment. For this reason, we can expect that the reform will produce an addi- 
tional efficiency gain related to the relative reduction of the incentive to work 
in the informal sector, which does not pay, among others, labor taxes. Never- 
theless,  this gain will be of  a smaller magnitude and come at an even more 
gradual pace than the previous 
80. See Kotlikoff (1995) for a detailed discussion in these terms of the paradigmatic Chilean 
81. These percentages are below the legal maximum (10 percent), which gives an idea of the 
82. For an analysis of these changes applied to the U.S. economy and using the Auerbach- 
83. We could not obtain statistics on this linkage. 
84. Note that there are still employers’ contributions, and consequently, there is incentive to 
work in the informal sector on these grounds. Note also that a worker can contribute as self- 
employed and still work in the informal sector. 
social security reform. 
influence of PFAs’ financial planning policies. 
Kotlikoff model, see Kotlikoff (1995, 1996a. 1996b) and references therein. 135  Argentina’s Generational Accounts 
A last point to consider with respect to the efficiency gains mentioned here 
is that they need to be calculated together with the potential distortions that the 
fiscal mechanisms used to finance the transition might produce in the economy 
(e.g., they may distort, themselves, the labor supply). Argentina’s method is 
not clear. It changed substantially since the draft law project up to the rulings 
of the law, and subsequently with the Social Security Solidarity Law. However, 
we may safely state that it will largely involve deficit financing by increasing 
the public debt and selling the government’s remaining share in public enter- 
prises. 
Finally, note that initial generations must stay at least in the same welfare 
situation following the reform. If this is not the case, long-run gains may be 
originated basically at their expense. By the same token, certain policies like 
short-term deficit financing of the transition may help to protect initial genera- 
tions from the negative impact of  the reform. However, if these policies get 
out of control, the opposite situation will arise; that is, they will make initial 
generations better off and future generations worse off. In this sense, the calcu- 
lation and payment of the government’s total debt with current pensioners play 
key roles. These issues are ambiguous in Argentina, with most of the ambiguity 
originating after the promulgation of the Social Security Solidarity Law. 
5.6  Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we used the generational accounting technique to assess the 
sustainability of the convertibility plan’s fiscal policy and to analyze two funda- 
mental aspects of it, namely, the public enterprise privatization program and 
the social security reform. 
We found, under the central assumptions, a significant generational imbal- 
ance of 75 percent, and the imbalance turned out to be as huge as 146 percent 
for the special baseline case. This implies that future Argentinean generations 
will have to pay on average net taxes that are 1.8 to 2.5 times larger, after ad- 
justing for growth, than the ones current generations are estimated to pay  if 
they continue to be subject to the 1994 fiscal policy for the rest of their lives. 
Therefore, based  on this imbalance,  we  conclude that  the  convertibility 
plan’s fiscal policy is not sustainable as it implies that future Argentinean gen- 
erations will have to pay intolerably high net taxes (taxes minus transfers). 
This result is robust to reasonable variations in the discount rate and growth 
rate assumptions. In particular, we detected large imbalances for all combina- 
tions of these variables. According to these imbalances, future generations of 
Argentineans will pay, in present value, net taxes that range from 1.7 to 7.5 
times the amount 1994 newborn Argentineans are expected to pay, given the 
current policy. 
We also tested the robustness of the above baseline results to our choice of 
capital income tax profile and to the inclusion of the inframarginal adjustment 
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both cases all our results  are confirmed. However, we should remark that in 
the latter instance, as the adjustment allocates the burden of the capital income 
tax  away  from  future  generations,  the  generational  imbalance  is  reduced. 
Moreover, the size of this reduction is fairly large. This point notwithstanding, 
the imbalances are still significant and in several cases huge. 
Then we analyzed the impact of  the aging of Argentina’s population. We 
concluded that if the population structure were to remain constant, younger 
generations would be better off and the generational imbalance would be sig- 
nificantly smaller in the central assumption case and smaller though still huge 
in the special baseline case. 
Another result of the sensitivity analysis highlights the importance of gov- 
ernment debt, whose hypothetical cancellation would reduce drastically the 
generational imbalance. Finally, the alternative treatment of government edu- 
cational expenditure as government consumption also reduced the size of the 
generational imbalance as it implied an increase in the tax burden of newborn 
generations relative to future generations. 
A study of the alternative policies needed to achieve generational balance, 
which  included the calculation of  the immediate and permanent  increase in 
alternative  tax  revenues  or reduction  in  alternative  transfers  or government 
expenditure, led us to the following conclusions. First, the magnitude of the 
required adjustment is, obviously, associated with the weight of the policy in- 
strument chosen within total revenues or expenditures. Second, the huge Ar- 
gentinean generational imbalance implies adjustments for certain policy in- 
struments that are not reasonable. Third, we are left with few choices, mainly 
social security benefits and government consumption, and fourth, in view of 
the size of  the required adjustments, a mix of policy instruments should be 
used rather than a single one of them. 
We identified two potential generational account effects of the privatization 
program, namely, a change in government net wealth  and a variation  in the 
present value in year t of all future net tax payments. With the statistical infor- 
mation available we were able to address the first of these changes. We con- 
cluded that the privatization program had an estimated negative impact on gov- 
ernment net wealth of $9.98 billion (about 3.5 percent of 1994 GDP) implying 
2 and  10 percent increases in Argentina’s generational imbalance under the 
central and special baseline assumptions, respectively. 
Subsequently, we assessed the generational account effects of the social se- 
curity reform. In particular, we studied the magnitude of the reduction in pen- 
sion payments required to achieve generational balance and to match the in- 
crease in public debt generated by the reclassification of liabilities associated 
with this reform. We concluded that after this reduction (34 or 48 percent), the 
remaining funds seem scarcely enough for the government to be able to meet 
the BUP benefit, the payments to the workers who chose the public pension 
system (APP, disability, survivorship, and advanced age pension benefits), and 
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Thus this reinforces our previous conclusion that a mix of policies is needed 
to restore intertemporal budget balance. 
Additionally, it is necessary to remark that about 60 percent of the funds that 
workers deposited with PFAs were in turn invested in public bonds. Therefore, 
in government intertemporal budget terms the present value of  net taxes was 
reduced  but  public  debt  was  increased.  Specifically,  social security  contri- 
butions  were  changed-partially-into  loans to the government, that  is, a 
“change of words.” 
Finally, we must highlight that while based  on the cash-deficit  approach 
multilateral  organizations and international investors considered the convert- 
ibility plan within a stabilization paradigm, the results of the generational ac- 
counting technique introduced a series of doubts about it and, in particular, 
allowed us to judge its fiscal policy unsustainable. 
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